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INSUFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR ORANGE BOOK 
CORRECTIONS AND THE FDA’S MINISTERIAL ROLE:     
A NEED FOR REFORM 
JANE F. DJUNG 
The Hatch-Waxman Act revolutionized the prescription drug industry 
by streamlining the process for generics to gain FDA approval. The Act is 
credited as the primary source of infusing generics into the present day 
pharmaceutical landscape. However, overly broad use codes provided by 
the brand drug manufacturers for publication in the Orange Book may 
preclude generic manufacturers from a section viii statement, which may 
severely impede the healthcare consumer from access to affordable 
generic drugs.   
Although the FDA is responsible for publishing the Orange Book, it 
does not review its substantive information. As a result, generic com-
panies were left without a mechanism to challenge an overly broad use 
code that may prevent or impede the launch of a generic drug. As a patch 
for this procedural hole, Congress introduced the counterclaim provision 
as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003. However, to invoke the counterclaim 
provision, the generic company must engage in a cumbersome process as 
highlighted by Justice Sotomayor in Caraco Pharmaceuticals v. Novo 
Nordisk.   
This Note explores the road to the counterclaim provision, examines 
the Supreme Court’s construction of the counterclaim provision, and 
highlights Justice Sotomayor’s illuminative remarks. Finally, this Note 
argues for elevated FDA oversight and proposes requiring use codes to be 
identical to the FDA-approved use, provided that the approved method of 
use is within the scope of the patent claims.  
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INSUFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR ORANGE BOOK 
CORRECTIONS AND THE FDA’S MINISTERIAL ROLE:     
A NEED FOR REFORM 
JANE F. DJUNG∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Generic prescription drugs are a vital component of the national 
healthcare landscape. Since the introduction of the revolutionary Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 19841colloquially 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Actthirty years ago, generic drugs have 
impacted the prescription drug market by providing affordable necessary 
drugs to the public, saving American consumers, taxpayers, and federal 
and state governments trillions of dollars.2 Prescription generic drugs have 
since grown to be a mainstay in the prescription drug landscape, as 
American healthcare consumers have increasingly relied on their safety 
and effectiveness.3   
A published national compendium called the “Orange Book,” formally 
known as the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations,4 plays a pivotal role, within the context of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, in determining generic drug entry into the marketplace. The Orange 
Book is a publication by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of 
all FDA-approved drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FD&C Act) and the drugs’ respective information, including a drug’s 
therapeutic equivalence evaluation, active ingredient, patent information, 
and application holder, among other things.5 This publication is heavily 
relied upon by: (1) healthcare providers and pharmacies as a reference for 
                                                                                                                          
∗ University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2015. I would like to thank Professor 
Alan Bennett, Professor Rady Johnson, and Professor Susan Pocchiari for their insightful and 
invaluable feedback in drafting this Note. In addition, I would like to thank my Notes and Comments 
Editor, Bret Kupfer, for his thoughtful suggestions. Lastly, many thanks to my colleagues on the 
Connecticut Law Review. Without them, this Note would not be possible. All inaccuracies and errors 
contained herein are mine alone. 
1  Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].  
2 Generic Pharm. Ass’n, Generic Drug Savings in the U.S. Fourth Annual Edition: Savings $1 
Trillion Over 10 Years, GPHA 1, 3 (2012), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/ 
IMSStudy Aug2012WEB.pdf. 
3 Id. 
4 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL PROCESS, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2014). 
5 Id. 
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essential safety and efficacy information;6 and (2) generic prescription drug 
companies for information about branded drugs (pioneer drugs or brand 
drugs) in determining whether to market a generic version of a branded 
drug.7 The submission of inaccurate information to the Orange Book by a 
brand-name drug company (innovator drug company or brand company) 
could severely impede or preclude the healthcare consumer from having 
access to necessary affordable generic drugs. Although the FDA is 
responsible for maintaining and publishing the Orange Book pursuant to 
the Hatch-Waxman Act,8 the FDA does not critically evaluate the accuracy 
of substantive information pertaining to patents and use codes9  provided 
by brand-name drug companies.10 The FDA contends that it only holds a 
“ministerial role” in this regard.11 This lack of FDA oversight significantly 
impacts generic drug companies, the brand-name drug companies, and 
ultimately, the healthcare consumer.   
Some assert that the Hatch-Waxman Act has not achieved its intended 
purpose of balancing the interests of market entry for generics and 
supporting continued innovation. From the perspective of brand-name drug 
companies, some contend that the Act has benefited generics at the cost of 
harming innovation for new or improved drugs. The task of discovering 
new medicines is a lengthy, costly, and risky research endeavor by name-
brand drug companies. By the time an FDA-approved drug product reaches 
the market, ten to fifteen years will have elapsed since the first synthesis of 
the new active substance.12 Furthermore, a significant amount of research 
is involved before the first synthesis of the new drug candidate is even 
achieved. On average, only one to two out of every ten thousand 
                                                                                                                          
6 Terry G. Mahn, Is It Time for FDA to Revise Its Orange Book Rules to Deal with Skinny 
Labeled Generic Drugs?, 1 FOOD & DRUG POL’Y F., OCT. 12, 2011, at 1, 2. 
7 Id.  
8 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 4 (stating that under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA is 
required to make a list of approved drug products publically available along with monthly 
supplements). 
9 The use code is “a description of any method-of-use patent [that a brand drug company] holds.” 
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(c)(2)(ii)(P)(3), (e) (2011); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 
1670, 1676 (2012). The use code is supplied by the brand drug company and is submitted to the FDA 
to be published in the Orange Book.  Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
10 See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (concluding that 
the FDA does not have a “duty . . . to review submitted information to determine whether all of the 
listed patents claim the drug that is the subject of the NDA”); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 
227, 242–43 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the FDA serves a “ministerial” role with respect to the Orange 
Book); Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The FDA, pursuant 
to longstanding practice and its own regulations, and based on its acknowledged lack of expertise and 
resources, has refused to become involved in patent listing disputes, accepting at face value the 
accuracy of NDA holders’ patent declarations and following their listing instructions.”).   
11 aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 243.  
12 Int’l Fed’n of Pharm. Mfr. & Ass’ns, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Global Health: Facts 
and Figures 2012, IFPMA, 1, 7 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/ 
content/Publication/2013/IFPMA_-_Facts_And_Figures_2012_LowResSinglePage.pdf. 
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compounds synthesized will successfully pass all stages of development 
required to become an FDA-approved drug.13 The research required to 
bring innovative drugs to market is exceeding difficult and costly. The cost 
of developing one drug has been estimated at over $1.3 billion.14   
Without innovation from brand-name drug companies, necessary drugs 
now available for the betterment of people’s health may not have come to 
fruition. Innovation from brand-name drug companies has substantially 
improved healthcare. For instance, in the past ten years, well over three 
hundred medicines have been approved for hard-to-treat diseases.15 
Conditions, such as cardiovascular diseases, which necessitated extensive 
treatment in the 1970s, are now more easily managed with oral drugs.16 
The annual death rate for cancer patients has been reduced by fifty percent 
due to drug advancements.17 In addition to improving the healthcare of 
individuals, healthcare costsincluding hospitalization costshave 
significantly decreased.18 Specifically, for every dollar spent on innovative 
cardiovascular drugs, over three dollars were saved in healthcare costs.19 
Brand-name drug companies bear the risk of developing innovative 
drugsespecially for unmet medical needswhich ultimately provide a 
common good for all. 
Brand-name drug companies clearly have a strong interest and need to 
recoup their financial research investments.20 Without a financial reward, 
there can be no future innovation. With the level of risk and mounting 
research costs required to bring innovative drugs to the market coupled 
with the concerns of patent life, brand-name companies have strong 
incentives to find ways to prolong their ability to maintain market 
exclusivity without generic competition. 
                                                                                                                          
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 8. 
15 Id. at 16. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. (“[F]or every dollar spent on prescription drugs in the United States, more than two dollars 
are saved in hospitalization costs”). 
19 Id. at 32.  
20 See Lawrence Perkins, Pharmaceutical Companies Must Make Decisions Based on Profit, 175 
W.J. MED. 422, 422–23 (2001) (“[Pharmaceutical companies] must generate the highest level of 
profitability possible to fulfill [their] fiduciary duty of maximizing shareholder value. . . . The revenue 
generated from a successful product must recover the cost of not only that product’s research and 
development but also the cost of failed ventures.”); Pharm. Research & Mfg. of Am., Intellectual 
Property Protections Are Vital to Continuing Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry, PHRMA, 
http://www.phrma.org/innovation/intellectual-property (last visited Sept. 1, 2014) (“For every 5,000 to 
10,000 experimental compounds considered, typically only one will gain [FDA] approval, after 10 to 
15 years of research and development costing an average of $1.2 billion . . . . The few successes must 
make up for the many failures . . . [where] only two out of every 10 medicines will recoup the money 
spent on their development.). 
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For healthcare consumers, the government’s most recent National 
Health Expenditure Accounts report shows that $2.6 trillion was spent in 
the United States on healthcare in 2010, “which translates to $8,402 per 
person or about [eighteen] percent of the nation’s Gross Domestic 
Product.”21 The National Health Expenditure Accounts report further notes 
that healthcare spending is expected to grow by about six percent per year 
through 2018, which would overtake the annual growth of the overall 
economy by slightly over two percent per year to reach $4.4 trillion by 
2018.22 With rapidly escalating healthcare costs, the use of lower-cost 
generic prescription drugs plays an essential component in holding down 
the growth rate of healthcare spending. Over the past decade, the U.S. 
healthcare system amassed about $1.07 trillion in savings due to the 
availability of generic drugs, with $192.8 billion saved in 2011.23 For thirty 
years, generic prescription drugs have allowed millions of Americans to 
obtain the medicine they need at an affordable cost. Efforts and policies 
that aid in this national goal should be considered, while unnecessary 
impediments, such as inaccurate Orange Book listings, should be 
discouraged or eliminated. 
This Note examines the lack of FDA review of the Orange Book 
within the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act with particular attention paid 
to the rationale behind the FDA’s longstanding view of its role. This Note 
also focuses on the lack of an efficient and effective procedural mechanism 
available for generic companies faced with overly broad use codes. In 
addition, cases (and events) that led up to the counterclaim provision as a 
remedy for the procedural hole are examined.   
Part II describes the Hatch-Waxman Act and provides an overview of 
the pathways for generic market entry by means of paragraph I–IV 
certifications or a section viii statement. It further explains how the 
innovator’s patents may determine whether a generic company must file a 
paragraph IV certification or a section viii statement. Part III provides an 
explanation of the FDA’s ministerial role with regard to the Orange Book. 
Part III further highlights procedural issues that exist for a generic 
company that challenges an incorrect Orange Book listing, summarizes 
Federal Circuit Court cases that underscore this issue, and introduces the 
counterclaim provision as Congress’s solution for this procedural hole. Part 
IV focuses on the Supreme Court case Caraco Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk,24 in which the counterclaim provision was 
employed, and how the Court construed the provision. Part IV also focuses 
on issues with the counterclaim provision and highlights Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                          
21 Generic Pharm. Ass’n, supra note 2, at 1. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012). 
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s criticisms of the provision. Lastly, Part V 
suggests a need for additional administrative measures, offers some 
reasonable and practical suggestions provided by jurists and commentators, 
and proposes a possible solution.   
II.  THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
A.  Purpose 
The primary legal embodiment that delineates the relationship between 
generic drug companies and innovator brand drug companies is the Hatch-
Waxman Act.25 The Hatch-Waxman Act, which introduced amendments to 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, is “often credited with creating 
the modern generic drug industry.”26 The policies underpinning this 
revolutionary Act were implemented to facilitate the entry of prescription 
generic drugs into the market while encouraging brand drug innovation by 
introducing complex mechanisms that involve FDA labeling regulations, 
FDA drug safety and efficacy regulations, and patent law.27  
To balance the facilitation of market entry for generic drugs with the 
preservation of brand drug companies’ incentives for continued innovation, 
the Act established Title I and II.28  Title I sets forth the procedures under 
which the FDA may approve applications for generic versions of pioneer 
drugs under the FD&C Act, while Title II restores some of the patent life 
lost for new drugs as a result of FDA premarket testing and approval 
requirements.29  
Prior to its enactment, there were two primary reasons for the lack of 
generics available to the public: cost and the length of time required to gain 
entry into the market. In 1983, the Supreme Court held in United States v. 
Generix Drugs30 that generic drugs were considered “new drugs.”31 As a 
result, generics were held to the same rigorous efficacy and safety testing 
                                                                                                                          
25 Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange 
Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 166 (2005). 
26 Lisa Barons Pensabene & Dennis Gregory, Hatch-Waxman Act: Overview (2013), available at 
http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/Hatch-
Waxman%20Act%20Overview%20lpensabene_dgregory.pdf. 
27 Derzko, supra note 25, at 166. 
28 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (1984) (stating that under Title I (Abbreviated New 
Drug Applications), the “Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 355) is amended” and 
that under Title II (Patent Extension), “Title 35 of the United States Code is amended by adding” § 
156). 
29 Id.; Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the 
Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG 
COSM. L.J. 269, 270–71 (1985) (stating the reasoning underlying Title I and Title II and indicating that 
Title II (patent life restoration) may pertain to human biological products and medical devices). 
30 460 U.S. 453 (1983). 
31 Id. at 461; Flannery & Hutt, supra note 29, at 273. 
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standards as new drugs32 without consideration given to any of the 
previously compiled data of the innovator drug, even though many of the 
scientific studies for the generic version were merely duplicating results of 
the brand drug.33 This standard for genericsessentially a New Drug 
Application (NDA) drug approval process34was “prohibitively costly” 
and time-consuming; hence, it did not necessarily motivate generic drug 
manufacturers to place generic drugs into the stream of commerce.35 The 
generation of safety and efficacy data was required for the generic, in part, 
because the FDA took the stance that any prior NDA information 
generated by a brand company for a new drug was confidential 
information.36 Furthermore, in order for a generic company to commence 
any clinical studies, it had to wait until the brand company’s patents for a 
particular drug of interest expired. Any unlicensed activity of a patent 
protected drug by another company could result in infringement 
litigation.37  
The Hatch-Waxman Act is credited as the primary source for the 
infusion of generics into the present day landscape of pharmaceuticals. The 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments effectively introduced mechanismsalbeit 
complex onesthat revolutionized the prior regime and widened the door 
for less-expensive generic prescription drugs to enter the market and be 
accessible to millions of healthcare consumers. Before its adoption, no 
streamlined FDA approval process existed for generic drugs.38 At the time 
of enactment, less than twenty percent of prescribed drugs were generic.39 
Today, seventy-five percent of all prescriptions are filled with a generic 
drug.40 Although the accessibility of less-costly generics has benefited 
healthcare consumers, the Hatch-Waxman statutory scheme has proven to 
                                                                                                                          
32 For a new drug to enter the market, the brand manufacturer must receive FDA approval of a 
new drug application (NDA). Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, before submitting a NDA, the generic 
manufacturer had to subject the generic version of the drug to the investigational new drug (IND) 
process, which included Phase I, II, and III clinical testing, to demonstrate that the drug was safe and 
efficacious for a particular indication.  See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 624–
32, 676–77 (3d ed. 2007) (providing a general description of the IND and NDA processes).   
33 Derzko, supra note 25, at 167. 
34 HUTT ET AL., supra note 32, at 676–77. 
35 Derzko, supra note 25, at 167. 
36 Id. The paper NDA process was available and provided a limited exception to the strict NDA 
requirements by permitting a generic drug company to rely on the published safety and efficacy data of 
an innovator drug. Id. But usually published data was deemed inferior and hence, was insufficient to 
warrant NDA approval. Id. 
37 Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 1, 3. 
38 Frederick R. Ball & Elese Hanson, Patent Use Codes, the Orange Book and Section viii 
Statements:  A Response to Terry Mahn’s Is It Time for FDA to Revise Its Orange Book Rules to Deal 
with “Skinny-Labeled” Generic Drugs?, 1 FOOD & DRUG POL’Y F., Dec. 14, 2011, at 1, 2; Pensabene 
& Gregory, supra note 26, at 1. 
39 Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 2. 
40 Id.  
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be a thorn in the side of brand pharmaceutical companies.41 In the wake of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, pioneer drug companies wereand still 
areprogressively concerned with the implications of the Act on their 
revenue, which affects their ability to sustain new innovation. The intricate 
and complex Hatch-Waxman Act, while attempting to balance the “two 
countervailing tasks” of meeting the interests of social welfare concerns in 
providing affordable drugs to the public and accommodating the brand 
drug companies, is susceptible and vulnerable to “both innovators and 
generics [that engage] in strategic behavior . . . to better their own 
economic positions.”42    
B.  Pathways for Generic Market Entry: Paragraph I–IV Certifications 
and the Section viii Statement of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme 
Pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic company may seek 
approval from the FDA to market a generic version of a branded drug. 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act there are two types of applications for 
approval of a generic drug:  (1) an Abbreviated New Drug Application43 
(ANDA); and (2) a paper NDA.44 For an ANDA, a generic drug company 
must demonstrate that the generic version “is effectively a duplicate” of the 
Reference Listed Drug (RLD)45the brand drug. Rather than producing 
independent scientific safety and efficacy data, the ANDA applicant can 
“piggy-back[] [off of] the brand’s NDA.”46 In order for the ANDA to be 
accepted, the generic must contain the same active ingredient, route of 
administration, dosage form, strength, intended use, and labeling as the 
RLD.47 The ANDA applicant must establish that the generic drug in 
question is equivalent in bioavailabilitybioequivalentto the RLD.48 A 
drug is deemed bioequivalent when it delivers the same concentration of 
the active ingredient to the patient’s blood stream, or site of action, over 
the same time period as the RLD.49 
                                                                                                                          
41 Id.  
42 Derzko, supra note 25, at 167, 168.   
43 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).  
44 Id. § 355(b)(2) (2012); Derzko, supra note 25, at 171–72. Paper NDAs are outside the scope of 
this Note and will not be discussed.   
45 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv) (2012); Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 2.   
46 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).  
47 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2012).    
48 21 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2014) (defining “bioavailability” as “the rate and extent to which the active 
ingredient or active moiety is absorbed from a drug product and becomes available at the site of action” 
and “drug product” as “finished dosage form, e.g., tablet, capsule, or solution, that contains the active 
drug ingredient, generally, but not necessarily, in association with inactive ingredients”); Caraco, 132 
S. Ct. at 1676. 
49 Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 2; see HUTT ET AL., supra note 32, at 755 (inferring 
that bioequivalence is when two drugs have the same bioavailability or “biological availability”).    
 238 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:229 
The Hatch-Waxman Act introduced several mechanisms by which an 
ANDA applicant (the generic drug company) may gain entry into the 
pharmaceutical market by challenging the innovator drug company’s 
patent exclusivity. The ANDA applicant, after consulting the Orange 
Book, may make one of the following four certifications:50  (1) paragraph I 
certification (there is no appropriate patent listed in the Orange Book); (2) 
paragraph II certification (the pertinent listed patent has expired); (3) 
paragraph III certification (the appropriate listed patent and other non-
patent market exclusivities are scheduled to expire before the requested 
approval);51 or (4) paragraph IV certification (a statutory and artificial 
infringement of the brand drug).52 For a paragraph IV certification, the 
ANDA applicant must provide a notice letter to the NDA holder53 (the 
brand company) within twenty days after the FDA accepts the ANDA.54 
The notice letter alerts the brand company that an ANDA has been 
submitted to the FDA and provides the basis for the certificationthat the 
brand company’s drug patent is not valid or will not be infringed upon.55 
The ANDA applicant that submits a paragraph IV certification for the 
“purpose of such submission is to obtain approval . . . to engage in the 
commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . . before the expiration of 
[the RLD’s] patent” is committing an act of statutory patent infringement,56 
which in turn provides a right for the brand company to sue for 
infringement within forty-five days of receiving the certification.57 If the 
brand company elects to file an infringement suit, the FDA may not 
approve the generic company’s ANDA for thirty months (the “thirty-
month stay”)58 or until a court holds that the listed patent is invalid or not 
infringed, whichever is earlier. However, if the NDA holder does not 
respond within the forty-five day time frame, the ANDA applicant is 
permitted to file a declaratory judgment action for non-infringement and 
                                                                                                                          
50 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iv) (2012).  
51 “Non-patent” and “patent-based factors” exclusivity include orphan drug exclusivity (seven 
years), new chemical entity exclusivity (five years from the first approval of the NDA, but an ANDA 
along with a paragraph IV certification can be filed after four years of the NDA approval, three years 
after the first NDA approval), and pediatric exclusivity (tacks on six months of market exclusivity to 
any patent exclusivity). Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 2–3. 
52 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2012). 
53 For large pharmaceutical companies, the patentee and NDA holder are usually the same entity. 
However, if the patentee is a different entity from the NDA holder, then the ANDA applicant must also 
provide a notice letter to the patentee. Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 3. 
54 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3) (2012). 
55 Id. §§ 355(b)(3), (j)(2)(B) (2012); Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 3. 
56 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012); Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 3. 
57 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 
1670, 1677 (2012).  
58 35 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012); Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677. If the RLD has NCE (new 
chemical entity) exclusivity, the thirty-month stay commences once the market exclusivity expires. 
Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 5. 
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patent invalidity, and the brand company loses its right to a thirty-month 
stay.59  The policy underlying the thirty-month stay is intended to provide 
the brand drug company certainty that the generic drug company cannot 
launch the generic drug during litigation within the thirty-month period.60   
To incentivize generic companies to file ANDAs along with paragraph 
IV certifications, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 180-day marketing 
exclusivity period to the first ANDA applicant who prevails in a paragraph 
IV litigation.61 This first paragraph IV filer exclusivity62 precludes final 
approval for all other ANDAs asserting paragraph IV certification.63 A 
generic company entitled to exclusive marketing rights against all other 
generics for 180 days garners a large revenue gain.64 Obtaining this 
exclusivity is an underlying motivation for the generic industry.65 
The Hatch-Waxman scheme also provides ANDA applicants with 
another pathway toward marketing generic drugs through a section viii 
statement.66 Unlike a paragraph IV certification, a section viii statement is 
not a statutory act of infringement; and hence, not an immediate trigger for 
patent infringement litigation.67 Instead, a section viii statement 
commonly known in the industry as “skinny labeling”68is a 
mechanism used by generic companies to “carve out”69 methods of use for 
a particular brand drug. A section viii statement is usually employed when 
the brand company’s patent on the composition of matter (the chemical 
drug compound itself) has expired and the brand company still holds a 
valid, unexpired patent for some FDA-approved treatment with the drug.70 
For a section viii statement, the generic company asserts to the FDA that 
its generic label does not overlap with the innovator brand company’s 
                                                                                                                          
59 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(D)(i)(I)(aa), (j)(5)(C)(i)(I)(aa) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2012). 
60 Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 5. 
61 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c) (2012); Derzko, supra note 25, at 174.  
62 Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 4. 
63 However, this “first-filer exclusivity” does not block approval for section viii statements filers. 
Id.  
64 See Jeremiah Helm, Comment, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 175, 180 (2007) (“The 
value of this bounty can be considerable . . . .”); Fei Mei Chan, Generic-Drug Firms Compete for 
Profits, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2001), http://www.forbes.com/2001/12/12/1212sf.html (stating that with the 
180-day exclusivity, “the generic company has a virtual market monopoly”); India’s Ranbaxy Gains; 
U.S. Drug Regulator Approves Generic Version of Novartis Drug, REUTERS (June 26, 2014), 
http://news.yahoo.com/indias-ranbaxy-gains-u-drug-regulator-approves-generic-035719879--sector. 
html (indicating that the generic drug maker, Ranbaxy, may bring in over $200 million in revenue from 
its generic version of Novartis AG’s blood pressure drug, Diovan, over the 180-day exclusivity). 
65 Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 2. 
66 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (2012). 
67 Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 4. 
68 Terry G. Mahn, Skinny Labeling and the Inducement of Patent Infringement, UPDATE 39, 39–
40 (2010). 
69 Id. at 41. 
70 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (2012). 
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FDA-approved drug label.71 In other words, assuming the ANDA meets 
other criteria, the generic company wishes to obtain FDA-approval to 
manufacture and market the generic drug for an FDA-approved treatment 
that is not patent-protected“a carve out” from the brand company’s 
approved label.72 Unlike a paragraph IV certification where the generic 
company must “bear the same label as the brand-name product,” a generic 
company seeking a section viii statement proposes a label that is not 
identical and does not overlap with any of the claimed uses.73 Since a 
section viii statement does not, in theory, create a statutory infringement on 
a brand company’s patent or assert that the patent is invalid, the FDA may 
grant immediate approval.74 
The FDA will approve an ANDA with a section viii 
statement only if (1) there is no overlap between the 
proposed label submitted by the ANDA applicant and the use 
described in the Orange Book, and (2) removing the 
information about the claimed method of use from the label 
does not render the drug less safe or effective.75 
C.  The Innovator’s Patents Determine a Paragraph IV Certification or a 
Section viii Statement 
The type of patent held by the brand drug company determines 
whether the ANDA applicant (a generic company) should assert a 
certification (paragraph I–IV) or section viii statement.76 Essentially, there 
are two types of patents pertaining to brand-name drugs: a composition of 
matter patent (claiming the drug compound itself) and a method of use 
patent (claiming a particular method of using the drug).77 Oftentimes, a 
brand drug company may be the owner of both types of patents for a drug 
where the drug compound expires before the method of use patent.78 Once 
the drug compound patent has expired, the FDA-approved methods of use 
that are not patent protected can be vulnerable to generics seeking a section 
viii statement.79 The presence of a valid composition of matter patent 
                                                                                                                          
71 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677; 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2012). 
72 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677. 
73 Id. 
74 Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 2. 
75 Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin, Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
76 See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676 (“[T]he FDA cannot authorize a generic drug that would 
infringe a patent . . . [which] depends on the scope and duration of the patents”). 
77 Id.; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE DRUG PRICE 
COMPETITION AND PATENT RESTORATION ACT OF 1984, http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/ 
testimony/ucm115218.htm (last updated July 24, 2009). 
78 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.  
79 See id. at 1677 (“A section viii statement is typically used when the brand’s patent on the drug 
compound has expired and the brand holds patents on only some approved methods of using the drug. 
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effectively precludes a section viii statement because any use of the drug 
itself, even for a method of use not patented by the drug company, is an 
infringement.80 Alternatively, an ANDA applicant may assert a paragraph 
IV certification when a patent exists for the drug compound itself or for a 
method of use for that drug.81 
III.  THE ROAD TO THE COUNTERCLAIM PROVISION 
A.  The Orange Book’s Role within the Hatch-Waxman Act and Listing 
Practices 
In accordance with the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA must maintain 
and publish a list of patents associated with approved drugs.82 This national 
compendium is the “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations”commonly known as the Orange Bookwhich 
effectively serves two functions: (1) as a reference for healthcare providers 
and pharmacies containing essential safety and “effectiveness” information 
about brand drugs and their respective generics;83 and (2) as a source of use 
codes and patent term information, among other things, for branded 
drugs.84 In this respect, the Orange Book is exceedingly important within 
the context of paragraph IV certifications and section viii statements. 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and FDA regulations, brand drug 
companies are required to submit “the patent number and expiration date 
of any patent which claims the drug for which the [brand] submitted the 
[NDA] or which claims a method of using such drug.”85 Once the FDA 
approves the NDA, the brand company is to supply a description of all 
methods of use patents it holdsknown as the “use code.”86 Prior to 2003, 
the NDA applicant was required to include: (1) the patent number and date 
                                                                                                                          
If the ANDA applicant follows this route, it will propose labeling for the generic drug that ‘carves out’ 
from the brand’s approved label the still-patented methods of use. The FDA may approve such a 
modified label as an exception to the usual rule that a generic drug must bear the same label as the 
brand-name product.”) (citations omitted); Arti Rai, Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives – A New 
Battle in the Drug-Patent Wars, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491, 491 (2012) (indicating that when “the 
main product patent on a brand-name drug expires before the use patents[,]” generic companies may 
file a section viii statement, which provides the generic drug “a potential path to market”). 
80 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
81 See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677 (“A generic manufacturer will typically take this [paragraph IV 
certification] path in either of two situations: if it wants to market the drug for all uses, rather than 
carving out those still allegedly under patent; or if it discovers . . . that any carve-out label it is willing 
to adopt cannot avoid the brand’s use code.”). 
82 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (c)(2) (2012).  
83 See Mahn, supra note 6, at 2 (stating that generics found to be therapeutically equivalent to the 
brand drug are given an “A” rating, which results in an accepted substitution for the brand drug). 
84 Id. 
85 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012); Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
86 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
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of patent expiration; (2) the type of patent (composition of matter or 
method of use patent); (3) the patent owner name; and (4) the information 
of the entity which is to receive patent certification if the patent owner is 
not in the U.S.87 In the 2003 Amendments, the FDA issued supplementary 
regulations requiring the NDA holder to supply information for each 
method of use patent claiming the approved drug, which includes: 
(1) [w]hether the patent claims one or more approved 
methods of using the approved drug product and a 
description of each approved method of use or indication and 
related patent claim of the patent being submitted; (2) 
[i]dentification of the specific section of the approved 
labeling for the drug product that corresponds to the method 
of use claimed by the patent submitted; and (3) [t]he 
description of the patented method of use as required for 
publication.88 
Notwithstanding the detailed requirements necessary for Orange Book use 
code listing, the FDA does not substantiate the patent information supplied 
by the brand company.89 Because of the lack of FDA oversight, it is 
possible that an innovator drug company may list inaccurate use codes90 
(including broad use codes),91 which frustrates the purpose of the Hatch-
Waxman Actthe interest in facilitating generic drugs into the market. In 
order for a generic company to market a generic version of a brand drug, it 
must first consult the Orange Book to determine the type of certification 
needed, if any (paragraph I–IV certifications or a section viii statement).92 
An inaccurate use code or overly broad use code could preclude, or at least 
make it exceedingly more difficult for, a generic version of the drug to 
reach the marketplace. In the presence of an overly broad use code, a 
generic company wishing to “carve-out” a method of use for a brand drug 
is precluded from using a section viii statement to garner a more immediate 
FDA approval.93 Instead, the generic company must now file a paragraph 
IV certification (statutory infringement) and litigate the validity of the 
                                                                                                                          
87 Derzko, supra note 25, at 170. 
88 Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 2 (paraphrasing 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(O) (2012)). 
89 Id.; Derzko, supra note 25, at 171. 
90 See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1330–32 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (exemplifying 
an allegation of improper Orange Book listing). 
91 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1679, 1687. 
92 See id. at 1676 (“After consulting the Orange Book, a company filing an ANDA must assure 
the FDA that its proposed generic drug will not infringe the brand’s patents.”). 
93 Id. at 1688 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]f the use code overlaps with the generic 
manufacturer’s proposed carve-out label (i.e., if the use code is overly broad), FDA will not approve an 
ANDA with a section viii statement.”). 
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brand company’s patent.94  Since the FDA is not responsible for the 
accuracy of the use codes and does not mandate that the brand company 
correct inaccurate use codes, improper listing practices effectively impede 
generic market entry. In 1994, the FDA was taken to task concerning its 
role with respect to the Orange Book.95 The FDA responded: 
[The] FDA does not have the resources or the expertise to 
review patent information for its accuracy and relevance to 
an NDA. Therefore, the agency declines the comment’s 
requests to ensure that patent information is complete and 
relevant to an NDA and to confirm, upon request, the validity 
of patent information submitted to the agency. The agency 
believes that the declaration requirements[,] . . . as well as the 
applicant’s potential liability if it submits an untrue statement 
of material fact, will help ensure that accurate patent 
information is submitted.96 
Even in recent years, including after the 2003 Amendments, the FDA 
maintains its assertion that “the agency [has] a purely ‘ministerial’ role as 
to patent listing issues.”97 
B.  The FDA’s “Ministerial” Orange Book Role: Court Validation 
The courts have validated the FDA’s longstanding view of its 
“ministerial” role over the Orange Book. In aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson,98 
the Fourth Circuit held that there are no statutory inconsistencies with the 
FDA’s view.99 The issue was whether there is an FDA obligation to police 
the accuracy of the NDA holder’s Orange Book listing.100 To assess the 
FDA’s interpretation of its governing statute, the court employed the two-
step framework established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.101 The two-step Chevron framework requires that the 
court first determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.”102 If congressional intent is clear then that is the “end of 
the matter.”103 Second, if the court determines that Congress has not 
                                                                                                                          
94 See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that “the generic manufacturer can . . . submit an 
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification . . . [and] wait for the brand manufacturer to institute suit” 
when the generic manufacturer is precluded from a section viii statement). 
95 Derzko, supra note 25, at 171. 
96 Id. (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,345 (Oct. 3, 1994)). 
97 Id. at 214. 
98 296 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2002). 
99 Id. at 241. 
100 Id. at 237. 
101 Id. at 237–39 (indicating that the court is employing the two-step framework as stated in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)). 
102 Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842. 
103 Id. 
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directly addressed the “question at issue,” or if the statute is equivocal or 
silent, then the court must determine whether the “agency’s [own] answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”104 The FDA relied on 
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2), which states:   
[I]f the holder of an approved [new drug] application could 
not file patent information [for a patent claiming a new drug] 
because no patent had been issued when an application was 
filed or approved, the holder shall file such information . . . 
not later than thirty days after the date the patent involved 
issued. Upon the submission of patent information under this 
subsection, the [FDA] shall publish it.105 
The FDA contended that this clearly points to the NDA holder’s 
responsibility for filing the necessary information, while the FDA’s role is 
“passive.”106   
However, aaiPharma (a generic company) asserted that subsections (d) 
and (e)107 indicate that the FDA has a responsibility to ensure that eligible 
patents are listed in the Orange Book. Subsections (d) and (e) respectively 
provide the basis by which the FDA may reject an NDA: (1) if “the 
application failed to contain the patent information prescribed by 
subsection (b) of this section[,] . . . [the FDA] shall issue an order refusing 
to approve the application”;108 and (2) if “the patent information prescribed 
by subsection (c) of this section was not filed within thirty days after the 
receipt of written notice from the [FDA] specifying the failure to file such 
information,” the FDA “shall . . . withdraw approval of an application.”109  
The court recognized that in isolation, each provision may be 
construed as an unequivocal expression of congressional intent with regard 
to the question at issue.110 However, under step one of the Chevron 
framework, the provisions taken collectively appeared as though there was 
ambiguity with the question at issue.111 Hence, the court proceeded to step 
two, where the court ultimately determined that the FDA’s reading of its 
role as ministerial was based on a permissible interpretation of section 
355.112 aaiPharma effectively condoned the FDA’s longstanding Orange 
Book “ministerial” responsibility, which does not include determining the 
merits of patent listings.   
                                                                                                                          
104 Id. at 843. 
105 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2) (2012); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2002). 
106 aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 238. 
107 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d)–(e) (2012). 
108 Id. § 355(d) (2012); aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 238. 
109 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2012); aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 238. 
110 aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 238. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 238–40. 
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C.  Procedural Issues in Challenging Orange Book Use Codes and the 
Lack of FDA Oversight 
In the 1990s, indications suggested that innovator drug companies 
were strategically taking advantage of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the 
Orange Book to prevent or delay the entry of generic drugs.113 In 2002, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) produced a study that detailed the 
strategicbut anticompetitiveconduct, which included a specific focus 
on the practice of brand companies submitting inaccurate patent 
information to the FDA and the lack of Orange Book listing review.114 
Furthermore, as early as 2002, the FTC had formally recognized issues 
regarding Orange Book listing practices and issued a citizen’s petition to 
the Commissioner of the FDA regarding the “listability” of patents in the 
Orange Book.115 In seeking guidance for Orange Book listing criteria, the 
FTC underscored the issue that “generic competition can be delayed on 
name-brand drug products if the name-brand companies newly list 
‘irrelevant and undefendable’ patents in the Orange Book near the 
expiration of the name-brand drug product’s original patents.”116 As of 
2002, there was no substantive recourse for a generic company to 
challenge the accuracy of an inaccurate Orange Book listing.117 By 
regulation, the limited measure available was to notify the FDA in writing, 
and in turn, the FDA would only request that the brand drug company 
confirm the accuracy of the listed information.118 Since the FDA views its 
responsibility in maintaining the Orange Book as “purely ministerial,” it 
“[does] not change the patent information in the list,” except when “the 
[NDA] holder withdraws or amends its patent information in response to 
the FDA’s request.”119 In other words, the FDA does not mandate any 
corrections or delisting of the brand name company’s use code and patent 
listings.120 Because the “Orange Book listing elevates every patent as a 
potential source of delay to generic competition,” the “Orange Book can be 
a strategic weapon.”121 
                                                                                                                          
113 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (2012). 
114 FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY i–iv, 39–40, 42–
45, 48 (July 2002), [hereinafter FTC STUDY] available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files 
/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf 
(focusing on strategic conduct by the brand pharmaceutical companies submitting inaccurate patent 
listings and taking advantage of the multiple thirty-month stays). 
115 Id. at 54–56. 
116 Id. at A-25. 
117 Id. at iv, 44–45. 
118 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) (2012); FTC STUDY, supra note 114, at 44. 
119 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) (2012). 
120 FTC STUDY, supra note 114, at 44. 
121 See Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 3 (indicating that the Orange Book was a “strategic 
weapon” in pre-2003 Amendments). 
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D.  Federal Circuit Cases: An Impetus  
Several generic companies have brought the issue of inaccurate Orange 
Book listings to the courts. Several Federal Circuit cases collectively serve 
as part of a significant force for congressional action.122 
1.  Mylan v. Thompson:  No Private Right of Action for Orange Book 
Correction 
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,123 the Federal Circuit 
held that generic companiesANDA applicantsdo not have a private 
right of action to challenge the NDA holder’s Orange Book listing as 
improper and to delist the patent.124 The court asserted that Mylan’s action 
essentially a right of action for delistingwas not a proper or 
“recognized” patent infringement defense under patent law, but a private 
right of action.125 In addition, the court stated that it is impermissible for a 
private party to enforce the FD&C Act.126   
There, Mylan sued Bristol-Myers Squibb seeking an order requiring 
Bristol-Myers Squibb to delist its patent from the Orange Book.127 In 
anticipation of the Bristol-Myers Squibb patent expiration for its drug 
BuSpar® (buspirone hydrochloride), Mylan acquired tentative approval of 
its ANDA application under a paragraph III certification (certification 
whereby the generic waits for the appropriate patent to expire before it is 
fully authorized for generic entry into the market).128 However, shortly 
before the buspirone patent expired,129 Bristol-Myers Squibb produced 
patents claiming the metabolite of the drug to the FDA,130 which 
                                                                                                                          
122 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (2012) (stating that Mylan 
Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson was responsible, in part, for congressional action); Derzko, supra note 25, 
at 181 (indicating that both Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson and Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. 
were cases that resulted in congressional action). 
123 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
124 Id. at 1332–33. 
125 Id. at 1332 (“Mylan’s arguments further bolster our conclusion that its claim is not a recognized 
defense to patent infringement. . . . Therefore, we are forced to conclude that Mylan’s action here 
against [BMS] is in essence an attempt to assert a private right of action for ‘delisting’ under the 
[FD&C Act].”). 
126 See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012) (“[A]ll such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain 
violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.”); Mylan Pharms., Inc., 268 
F.3d at 1330 (“It is well settled . . . that the FDCA creates no private right of action.” (quoting In re: 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1999))). Recognized defenses 
against patent infringement include only statutory defenses (which include non-infringement, 
unenforceability, and invalidity in the context of patentability) and inequitable conduct defense (which 
include unclean hands, fraud, and misuse). Mylan Pharms., Inc., 268 F.3d at 1331. 
127 Mylan Pharms., Inc., 268 F.3d at 1325. 
128 Id. at 1327. 
129 Id. at 1327–28 (indicating that BMS produced patents just eleven hours before the expiration 
of the original drug patent). 
130 Id. at 1328. 
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“ostensibly extend[ed] its rights over the drug, but in fact cover[ed] neither 
the compound nor any method of using [the compound].”131   
As a result of Mylan, the FTC correctly noted that the sole option for a 
generic company is to file a paragraph IV certification, which creates a 
statutory infringement and subjects the ANDA to a thirty-month stay 
before it can be approved.132 Hence, the lack of express statutory 
provisions enabling an action to challenge a brand company’s Orange 
Book listing impedes the underpinning of the Hatch-Waxman Actto 
facilitate the entry of generics into the market. 
2.  Andrx v. Biovail & aaiPharma v. Thompson: No Remedy for 
Generics Under the Administrative Procedure Act 
In Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp.,133 the Federal Circuit 
concluded that although there is not a private right of action for delisting as 
established in Mylan, a generic company has the option to bring a claim 
against the FDA under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).134 
Improper Orange Book listing conduct by the brand company (Biovail) 
was of controversy in Andrx.135 In 2001, Andrx (a generic company) 
prevailed in a non-infringement paragraph IV certification suit against 
Biovail concerning U.S. Patent No. 5,529,791 (patent ’791) for the active 
ingredient, diltiazem hydrochloride.136 As a result, the FDA was ready to 
approve Andrx’s ANDA; however, in the following month, Biovail listed 
an extended time-release formulation of diltiazem hydrochloride claimed 
in U.S. Patent No. 6,162,463 (patent ’463).137 In view of Biovail’s new 
listing, the FDA could no longer approve Andrx’s ANDA application.138 
Andrx contended that listed patent ’463 did not properly claim diltiazem 
hydrochloride and requested that the FDA delist patent ’463 from the 
Orange Book.139 Biovail affirmed that patent ’463 claims diltiazem 
hydrochloride, the drug itself, as supplied in the original NDA.140 In 
                                                                                                                          
131 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (2012) (referring to the 
brand company’s Orange Book listing practice in Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson).  
132 Id. (referring to the FTC STUDY indicating that this was the only recourse for generics in this 
predicament). 
133 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
134 Id. at 1378–80. 
135 Id. at 1377 (indicating that an incorrect patent listing, which did not claim the drug approved in 
the brand company’s original NDA, does not “permit [the brand company] Biovail to benefit from 
additional thirty-month stay”). Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. also significantly dealt with the 
brand company’s effort to garner multiple thirty-month stays, which is currently not available under the 
2003 Amendments. Id. at 1374, 1377. The issue of multiple thirty-month stays is outside the scope of 
this Note. 
136 Id. at 1372. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1373. 
140 Id. 
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addressing Andrx’s request for relief in court,141 the Federal Circuit 
concluded that although there is not a private right of action for delisting 
an Orange Book listing as established in Mylan, a generic company may 
bring a claim against the FDA under the Administrative Procedure Act to 
compel the FDA to approve the ANDA.142  
Federal Circuit Judge Alan Lourie criticized the Federal Circuit’s 
suggestion.143 In a dissenting opinion in another case, Judge Lourie 
asserted that when the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, the FDA did not 
anticipate having substantive issues of patent listing and that “[r]equiring 
patent listings to be addressed only by APA actions involving the FDA 
amounts in practical terms to a distortion of the provisions of the Food and 
Drug Act relating to patent listings and challenges.”144 Essentially, the 
Federal Circuit in Andrx put the FDA in the untenable position of having to 
address inaccurate patent listings in the Orange Book when the FDA has 
continuously expressed a lack of expertise and resources to review patent 
listings.145    
Recently, Federal Circuit Court Judge Timothy Dyk asserted that 
despite Andrx, prevailing in an APA challenge might not be likely.146 In 
order to prevail, the generic company must be able to demonstrate that the 
FDA’s refusal to police the Orange Book use codes conflicts with a statute 
or was “arbitrary and capricious.”147   
The Federal Court’s proposition for relief under an APA challenge was 
tested in the Fourth Circuit. In aaiPharma v. Thompson, a generic 
company (aaiPharma) brought a lawsuit under APA for the FDA to require 
the NDA holder (Eli Lilly) to submit a patent for listing in the Orange 
                                                                                                                          
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 1378–80; FTC STUDY, supra note 114, at 44.  
143 See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 295 F.3d 1274, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(Lourie, J., dissenting) (“Requiring patent listings to be addressed . . . by APA actions involving the 
FDA amounts in practical terms to a distortion of the provisions of the Food and Drug Act relating to 
patent listing and challenges.”). 
144 Id. at 1275 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
145 Derzko, supra note 25, at 181. 
146 See Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(Dyk, J., dissenting) (“Nor would there be a remedy in a suit under the [APA]. To be sure, we have 
held that an APA action could be brought to challenge FDA action in refusing to police use codes in the 
Orange Book, but at the same time we expressed no view as to whether such an action would succeed. 
To succeed in such an action, the ANDA applicant would have to establish that the FDA’s refusal to 
police codes was arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to the statute. We have subsequently held that the 
FDA is under no statutory obligation to determine the correctness of particular patent listings in the 
Orange Book, and that nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Act requires the FDA to screen Orange Book 
submissions . . . and refuse those that do not satisfy the statutory requirements for listing.”) (citations 
omitted).  
147 Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d 
at 1381–82 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
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Book.148 aaiPharma asserted that the FDA’s refusal to “police the 
correctness of Orange Book listings [was] arbitrary and capricious” 
because the FDA had delegated its administrative duties to private parties 
(NDA holders).149 The Fourth Circuit confirmed that the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard is narrow as established by the Supreme Court.150 In 
determining whether an agency’s act is “arbitrary and capricious,” the 
court must determine whether “the agency . . . examine[d] the relevant data 
and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”151 An 
agency’s rule may be deemed “arbitrary and capricious” if: (1) “the agency 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider”; (2) 
the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem”; 
(3) the agency has “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence before the agency”; or (4) the rule “is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or product of agency 
expertise.”152 Under this standard of review, the Fourth Circuit determined 
that, with respect to the Orange Book, the FDA was not arbitrary and 
capricious.153 First, the court asserted that the FDA’s “ministerial” role 
rested on a permissible construction of the Hatch-Waxman Act.154 The 
primary reason for this “ministerial” role is that the paragraph IV 
certification scheme was to have private parties’ intellectual property rights 
settled via patent infringement suits, while the FDA was to focus on the 
effectiveness and safety of the drugs.155  Consequently, it seems unlikely 
that Congress’s intent was to have the FDA take on this responsibility of 
reviewing the merits of Orange Book listings.156 Second, the court stated 
that “[w]hen an agency has discretion about whether to take on 
enforcement responsibilities, an explanation that it lacks the resources and 
                                                                                                                          
148 aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 233–34 (4th Cir. 2002). 
149 Id. at 241. 
150 See id. at 242 (indicating that the Supreme Court had established that the standard of review 
was set forth in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States v. State Farm Mutual 
Auto Insurance Company, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).  
151 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
152 Id. at 43. 
153 aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 242–43.  
154 Id. at 242. Several courts have affirmed the policy that the FDA serves a “ministerial” role 
with respect to the Orange Book. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1347–49, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Hatch-Waxman Act does not require the FDA to review patents substantively 
before listing in the Orange Book.”); aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 242–43 (“[T]he FDA may persist in 
its purely ministerial approach to the Orange Book listing process.”); Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. 
Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he FDA has a longstanding policy not to get 
involved with patent disputes. It administers the Hatch-Waxman Amendments in a ministerial fashion 
simply following the intent of the parties that list patents.”). 
155 aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 241. 
156 Id.   
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the expertise to do so is enough to satisfy the requirement of reasoned 
agency decision making.”157 Lastly, the FDA has never wavered in its 
position that it lacks the necessary resources and expertise to make patent 
law judgments.158   
It was apparent from case law that the Hatch-Waxman Act was not 
equipped to handle Orange Book listing issues and “was ripe for reform in 
this respect.”159 To further support this contention, Federal Circuit Judge 
Sheldon Plager asserted a need for reform:  
The need for the FDA to properly police the administration 
of the Act in this regard was made even more acute by our 
decision in Mylan . . . . If neither the Administration nor the 
courts see fit to make clear FDA’s obligation to administer 
the act in a responsible way, Congress should consider doing 
so.160 
Clearly, there was a significant need for reform of Orange Book listing 
practices within the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act as evidenced by the 
FTC Study, the courts and case law, and the frustration suffered by generic 
companies. Brand drug companies are “playing a new game: by 
inaccurately describing the scope of their method of use patents to [the] 
FDA, they are limiting the immediate approval pathway provided by 
section viii.”161 
E.  The Counterclaim Provision:  Congress’s Answer to Inaccurate and 
Overly Broad Orange Book Listings 
To address the manipulative Orange Book listing practices,162 
Congress created a legal counterclaim provision to a paragraph IV 
infringement lawsuit163 under the auspices of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.164 The new provision 
permits generic ANDA applicants sued for patent infringement to: 
assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the [brand 
                                                                                                                          
157 Id. at 242.  
158 Id. at 242–43. 
159 Derzko, supra note 25, at 184. 
160 Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Plager, J., concurring). 
161 Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 3. 
162 Based on the legislative history leading up to the counterclaim provision, it was well-known in 
Congress that brand drug companies were manipulating the Orange Book in the context of the Hatch-
Waxman Act to further stave off generic entry. See Derzko, supra note 25, at 224–26 (“What we saw, 
regrettably under Hatch-Waxman, was [that] there were games being played . . . .  This bill is an 
attempt to address those issues.” (quoting 149 CONG. REC. S8193 (daily ed. June 19, 2003) (statement 
of Sen. Gregg)). 
163 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012). 
164 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2456. .  
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drug manufacturer] to correct or delete the patent information 
submitted by the [brand drug manufacturer] . . . on the 
ground that the patent does not claim either(aa) the drug 
for which the [brand drug manufacturer’s NDA] was 
approved; or (bb) an approved method of using the drug.165  
In other words, this counterclaim provision enables a generic ANDA 
applicant to pursue a judgment that would compel a brand drug company 
to amend or delist patent information that precludes the FDA’s approval of 
the generic ANDA.166   
The counterclaim provision was recognized as a “patch” on the 
“procedural hole” that manifested in Mylan and Andrx.167 By establishing 
the counterclaim provision, legislators have recognized and addressed the 
issue and have tacitly rejected the idea of an administrative delisting 
mechanism. Although the counterclaim provision does provide a 
mechanism for delisting, generics view the procedural path as cumbersome 
and costly because the counterclaim is only used when engaged in a 
paragraph IV infringement action.168 Generic companies would have 
preferred an administrative review mechanism.169 Yet some scholars have 
recognized that such an administrative mechanism would be very 
unlikely.170  
IV.  THE COUNTERCLAIM PROVISION AT WORK 
A.  Caraco v. Novo Nordisk: Construing the Counterclaim Provision 
Caraco v. Novo Nordisk171 illuminates an underlying defect in the 
counterclaim provision.172 This Supreme Court case underscores the view 
                                                                                                                          
165 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012). 
166 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (2012). 
167 Derzko, supra note 25, at 242. 
168 See Alan Bennett et al., Supreme Court Rules on Patent Use Codes, ROPES & GRAY (Apr. 19, 
2012),  http://www.ropesgray.com/zh/news-and-insights/Insights/2012/04/supreme-court-rules-on-pate 
nt-use-codes.aspx (“Justice Sotomayor highlighted the fact that the availability of a counterclaim does 
not solve the problem inherent in the statute: because there is no validation of use codes submitted to 
FDA by brand manufacturers, costly and time-consuming litigation is necessary to correct overly broad 
use codes.”); Dianna Goldenson El Hioum, Caraco Pharamceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk 
A/S: Generics May Seek Correction of Overly Broad Use Codes, MERCHANT & GOULD (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.merchantgould.com/Resource_WP_2012_05_CaracoPharm.aspx (“Justice Sotomayor . . . 
points out that excess litigation might be avoided if the FDA clarifies its ‘remarkably opaque’ use code 
requirements so generics would not have to resort to the counterclaim provision to clear a path to 
market entry for non-infringing drugs. Until that happens or Congress amends Hatch-Waxman, . . . a 
cumbersome path to section viii approval is likely to continue.”). 
169 Derzko, supra note 25, at 242. 
170 Id. 
171 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012). 
172 Id. at 1678. 
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that NDA holders have manipulated the scheme by supplying inaccurate or 
overly broad use codes to preclude or stave generics from the market, 
especially in the context of section viii statements.173  
Caraco, a generic company, sought to manufacture and market 
repaglinide, a diabetes drug. Novo Nordisk, a brand drug company, 
manufactures the brand-name version of repaglinidemarketed as 
Prandin®which has been approved by the FDA for three uses in the 
treatment of diabetes: (1) repaglinide, the drug itself; (2) repaglinide in 
combination with metformin; and (3) repaglinide in combination with 
thiazolidinediones (TZDs).174  Novo Nordisk, the original NDA holder, 
owned patent U.S No. RE 37,035 (patent ’035) for the compound itself, 
which was set to expire in 2009.175  In 2004, Novo Nordisk was granted a 
method of use patentU.S. Patent No. 6,677,358 (patent ’358)which 
“claims a ‘method for treating [diabetes by] administering . . . repaglinide 
in combination with metformin.’”176 Patent ’358 was not set to expire until 
2018.177 However, Novo Nordisk did not hold a method of use patent for 
repaglinide in combination with TZDs.178  With this information in 2005, 
Caraco indicated to the FDA that it would wait until after patent ’035 (the 
composition of matter patent for repaglinide)179 expired in 2009 to market 
the generic version, but duly filed its ANDA along with a paragraph IV 
certification for patent ’358 (repaglinide in combination with 
metformin).180  
Because Novo Nordisk’s use code was only for patent ’358 (the “[u]se 
of repaglinide in combination with metformin to lower blood glucose”), 
the FDA advised Caraco that it could file a section viii statement, a “carve-
out,” for the other two uses not patent protected but FDA-approvedthe 
use for the treatment of diabetes with repaglinide itself and the use for the 
treatment of diabetes with repaglinide in combination with TZDs.181  This 
would permit Caraco to enter its generic version into the market without an 
infringement suit by Novo Nordisk.182 Before the FDA could approve 
Caraco’s ANDA, Novo Nordisk amended its use code to read a “method 
                                                                                                                          
173 Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 3–4. 
174 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1678. 
175 Id.; Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
176  Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1678. (quoting a claim in U.S. Patent No. 6,677,358 as stated in Novo 
Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 1678–79. 
179 Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 1362. 
180 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1679.   
181 Id. (quoting the Orange Book use code as stated in Novo Nordisk v. Caraco, 601 F.3d at 1362–
63). 
182 Caraco would be able to market their generic immediately for the two uses, provided that the 
ANDA was “otherwise in order” with regard to bioequivalence, etc. Id. 
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for improving glycemic control in adults with type 2 diabetes[,]”183 which 
encompassed all three FDA-approved methods. As a result of this overly 
broad use code, the FDA could no longer accept Caraco’s carve-out label; 
Caraco was effectively blocked from its ANDA and could not bring its 
generic version to market under a section viii statement.184   
Caraco reacted to Novo Nordisk’s newly broad use code by employing 
the statutory counterclaim provision in the on-going paragraph IV 
infringement suit, which it had initiated in 2005.185 The counterclaim was 
used to mandate Novo Nordisk to correct the use code to accurately reflect 
only the method of use for which there was patent protection.186 But the 
first issue at hand for the court was to determine the meaning and scope of 
the counterclaim provision.187   
Construction of the counterclaim provision hinged on the meaning of 
the words  “not . . . an” in the provision stating that the generic company 
that “sued for patent infringement may bring a counterclaim” based “on the 
ground that the patent does not claim . . . an approved method for using the 
drug.”188 The Federal Circuit construed “not . . . an approved method” to 
mean “not . . . any approved methods.”189 Hence, based on the Federal 
Circuit’s construction, the “Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes a counterclaim 
only if the listed patent does not claim any approved methods of using the 
listed drug.”190 The Federal Circuit effectively found that since Novo 
Nordisk had a valid patent for one FDA-approved method of use 
(repaglinide in combination with metformin), it would preclude Caraco 
from using the statutory counterclaim provision.191 However, the Supreme 
Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit and found that the “text and 
context demonstrate that the counterclaim is available not only (as in 
                                                                                                                          
183 Id. (quoting the amended use code as stated in Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 1363). 
184 Id. 
185 Id.  
186 Id.    
187 Id. at 1681–83. 
188 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012) (emphasis added); Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1680–81.  
189 Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
190 Id. at 1365 (emphasis added). 
191 Id. at 1380 (Dyk, J., dissenting). The Federal Circuit held that Congress intended the provision 
to allow courts to order a correction of patent numbers and expiration dates listed in the Orange Book 
but not to use code language. Id. at 1366. However, Federal Circuit Judge Dyk dissented from this 
construction and interpreted the provision in the context of the underlying basis for the counterclaim 
provision. Id. at 1368 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“In 2003, Congress enacted the counterclaim provision of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act in order to prevent manipulative practices by patent holders with respect to the 
Orange Book listings. These practices were designed to delay the onset of competition from generic 
drug manufacturers.”). He construed the provision to be used by an ANDA applicant “to assert the 
counterclaim to correct or delete the Orange Book ‘patent information submitted . . . under subsection 
(b) or (c)’ on the ground that the patent does not claim ‘the drug for which the application was 
approved’ or ‘an approved method of using the drug.’” Id. at 1370 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii) 
(2012)). 
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Mylan) when the patent listing is baseless, but also (as here) when it is 
overbroad.”192 The Supreme Court’s statutory construction interpreted 
“not . . . an” within the context of the statute.193 Also, by construing the 
statutory provision within the context of the overall purpose of the Hatch-
Waxman framework and its underlying goal, the Supreme Court stated that  
the counterclaim naturally functions to challenge the brand’s 
assertion of rights over whichever discrete use (or uses) the 
generic company wishes to pursue. That assertion, after all, is 
the thing blocking the generic’s entry on the market. The 
availability of the counterclaim thus matches the availability 
of FDA approval under the statute: A company may bring a 
counterclaim to show that a method of use is unpatented 
because establishing that fact allows the FDA to authorize a 
generic drug via section viii.194 
Novo Nordisk asserted that the underlying basis for the counterclaim 
provision was to aid generic companies that found themselves in the same 
predicament as in Mylanwhen the brand company’s use codes were 
baseless.195 However, the Supreme Court contended “Mylan alerted 
Congress to a broader problemthat generic companies generally had no 
avenue to challenge the accuracy of brands’ patent listings.”196 
B.  Counterclaim Provision Defects 
1.  Justice Sotomayor’s Concurring Opinion: Not a “Fix” for Overly 
Broad Orange Book Listings   
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Caraco, severe 
inefficiencies in employing the counterclaim provision exist.197 Although 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed with the Court’s holding and analysis, she 
thoughtfully stated that the counterclaim provision “can only lessen the 
difficulties created by an overly broad use code; it cannot fix them.”198 
Because a section viii statement is not an act of infringement, the 
                                                                                                                          
192 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1687. 
193 Id. at 1681 (giving examples of when “not an” is interpreted as “not any” and when it does not 
mean “not any” within different contexts and concluding that “[t]he meaning of the phrase turns on its 
context”). In addition, the Supreme Court also acknowledges that Congress did not intend “not an” to 
mean “not any” because Congress employed “not any” in an immediate, subsequent subclause which 
indicates to the Court that Congress “knew how to say ‘not any’ when it meant ‘not any.’” Id. at 1682. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 1686, 1687. 
196 Id. at 1687. 
197 See id. at 1688–89 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing the problems associated with the 
process and asserting that “the counterclaim cannot restore the smooth working of a statutory scheme 
thrown off kilter by an overly broad use code”). 
198 Id. at 1688. 
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counterclaim provision is not available for generics proposing a “carve-
out” label. As a result, a generic company in this predicament, wishing to 
employ the counterclaim provision to correct an overly broad Orange Book 
listing so that it can effectively file an ANDA application with a section 
viii statement must: (1) change its proposed non-infringing “carve-out” 
label to the identical brand company’s label and submit a paragraph IV 
certification to create a statutory infringement; (2) wait for the innovator 
brand company to sue for infringement; and (3) file the counterclaim 
provision.199 Finally, if the generic company prevails, then it can file the 
section viii statement as originally intended.200   
As asserted by Justice Sotomayor, this drawn-out procedure presents 
two salient issues:  (1) “[the process] results in [a] delay and [an] expense 
the statutory scheme [did] not envision”201which effectively undermines 
the underpinning of the Hatch-Waxman Act; and (2) the process is not 
“guarantee[d]” to work because the counterclaim provision is available 
only if the brand manufacturer files a paragraph IV suit.202 Justice 
Sotomayor raised concern over the lack of clarity when the brand company 
elects not to file suit,203 provided that the generic proceeds with its ANDA 
application.204 She asserted that the FDA may still approve the ANDA 
application “without prejudice to [the] infringement claims the patent 
owner might assert when the ANDA applicant produces or markets the 
generic drug.”205 Consequently, the generic company subjects itself to 
liability under the patent doctrine of induced infringement206 if the brand 
company still holds a patent for some approved method of using the 
druga precarious position for the generic drug company.207 To this end, 
Justice Sotomayor proclaimed that a “fix is in order, but it must come from 
Congress or FDA.”208 
 2. “Remarkably Opaque” FDA Regulations and Guidance for Orange 
Book Listing Practices 
In 2003, the FDA issued a “final rule” concerning patent submissions 
and listing requirements in the hopes that it would provide clarity and 
                                                                                                                          
199 Id.  
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 1689. 
203 Id. 
204 Alternatively, the generic company may decide not to pursue its ANDA application; hence, a 
generic version is precluded from entering the market. 
205 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
206 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).   
207 See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting that a generic company 
being “forced to proceed[] with a paragraph IV certification” and subject to an induced infringement 
claim “is not a position . . . a generic manufacturer wants to be in”). 
208 Id. 
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minimize opportunities and attempts for drug companies to “tak[e] 
advantage of [the] process,” among other things.209 As set forth by the 
“final rule” pertaining to method of use claims,  
the [NDA] applicant shall submit information only on those 
patents that claim indications or other conditions of use that 
are described in the pending or approved application . . . . 
For approved applications, the applicant submitting the 
method of use patent shall identify with specificity the 
section of the approved labeling that corresponds to the 
method of use claimed by the patent submitted.210 
The language in the new final rule (shown above in italics) replaced “of the 
pending or approved application” as stated in the pre-2003 listing rule. 
From the FDA’s perspective, this new limiting language clarifies that only 
method of use patents pointing to FDA-approved uses are to be listed in 
the Orange Book.211  In addition, a declaration form was instituted in an 
attempt to simplify patent listing and thwart deceptive listing practices. For 
the most part, the declaration form includes a series of “yes” or “no” 
questions pertaining to patent information.212 A handful of “yes” or “no” 
questions concerning drug substance, drug product, and method of use will 
ultimately determine whether the FDA will list the patent in the Orange 
Book.213 In addition to the binary questions, the form requires that the 
NDA applicant provide a “description of the approved indication or 
method of use”the Orange Book “Use Code”in fewer than 240 
characters.214 Lastly, the declaration certification warns that “willful and 
knowingly false statements” are deemed criminal offenses.215  
Notwithstanding the 2003 FDA listing rules, issues remain, as 
                                                                                                                          
209 Derzko, supra note 25, at 214. In addition, the final rule applies to only patents listed after 
August 18, 2003. Id. 
210 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
211 See Derzko, supra note 25, at 216 (suggesting that there is no longer ambiguity about what 
type of method of use can be listed in the Orange Book). 
212 Form FDA 3542, Patent Information Submitted Upon and After Approval of an NDA or 
Supplement, 2 (July 2007) asks “yes” and “no” questions pertaining to patents. For an image of the 
Form FDA 3542 (July 2007), see Deborah Herzfeld, Tom Irving & Donna Meuth, Orange Book Use 
Codes: Impact of Caraco v. Novo Nordisk, STRAFFORD (June 5, 2012),  http://media.straffordpub.com/ 
products/orange-book-use-codes-impact-of-caraco-v-novo-nordisk-2012-06-05/presentation.pdf. See 
also Derzko, supra note 25, at 218 (indicating that such forms with “yes” and “no” questions provide a 
“simple algorithm” for FDA personnel to “easily characterize a patent as being listable or not”). The 
form is in accordance with section 505(b) and (c) of the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  
213 For an image of the FDA Form 3542 (July 2007), see Herzfeld, Irving & Meuth, supra note 
212 . 
214 Id.  
215 Id. (“A willfully and knowingly false statement is a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. 1001.”); 
Derzko, supra note 25, at 218. 
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evidenced in Caraco.216 Although the central issue to the case was the 
counterclaim provision, broad Orange Book listing by the innovator drug 
company was the cause of this dispute.217 Justice Sotomayor noted that 
“[p]recisely because the [Hatch-Waxman] regulatory scheme depends on 
the accuracy and precision of use codes,”  the “FDA’s guidance as to what 
is required of brand manufacturers in use codes [is] remarkably opaque”218 
and further illuminates deficiencies in the FDA’s determinative listing 
criteria.219 These deficiencies include that 240 characters “may not fully 
describe the use as claimed in the patent,” a problem also recognized by 
the FDA,220 and the confusion as to whether the method of use or the 
indication satisfies the use code.221 
V.  REFORM SUGGESTIONS  
A.  The Need for Elevated FDA Oversight 
Currently, a generic company’s only recourse, if it takes issue with an 
inaccurate or overly broad Orange Book use code listing,222 is to employ 
the counterclaim provision in a paragraph IV litigation.223 Many federal 
judges and commentators have criticized the lack of FDA oversight and 
guidance regarding such a pivotal national compendium.224 Some 
                                                                                                                          
216 See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1689 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (describing some issues in the “FDA’s guidance as to what is required of brand 
manufacturers in use codes” and highlighting the inefficiency of counterclaim provision). 
217 Id. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]e are here today because of FDA’s opacity in 
describing what is required of brand manufacturers.”). 
218 Id.  
219 Id. at 1689–90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that “Novo [Nordisk] understood its . . . 
use code to comply with FDA regulations . . . that the regulations permit a brand manufacturer to 
submit for publication in the Orange Book a description of either the patented method of use or the 
indication (which refers to ‘what a drug does[]’)” and further suggesting that limiting brand 
manufacturers to 240 characters in describing the use code may not be sufficient). 
220 Id. at 1689. 
221 Id. at 1690. 
222 The generic party that takes issue with the accuracy of an Orange Book listing can “notify the 
FDA.” Then, the FDA will request the innovator drug company to confirm the listing information. 
Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, the FDA cannot supplant 
the innovator drug company’s assertion of Orange Book information. Id.; Ball & Hanson, supra note 
38, at 4. 
223 See Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 4, 10 n.60 (stating that “[in] view of [FDA’s] limited 
role, the only remedy for ANDA applicants lies with the courts” and referencing 68 Fed. Reg. at 
36,683, which states “[t]he courts have the experience, expertise, and authority to address complex and 
important issues of patent law”). This Note has established that the likelihood of prevailing in a 
challenge against the FDA under the APA is unlikely.   
224 See generally Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Precisely because the 
regulatory scheme depends on the accuracy and precision of use codes, I find FDA’s guidance as to 
what is required . . . [for] use codes [is] remarkably opaque.”); Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1353–54 (Plager, J., 
concurring) (“The need for the FDA to properly police the administration of the Act in this regard was 
made even more acute by our decision in Mylan Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. Thompson . . . .”); Michael 
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commentators assert that the lack of FDA oversight “render[s] section viii 
null and void,” which effectively forestalls a pathway for generics to enter 
the market.225 Furthermore, the FDA’s policy and regulatory regime may 
encourage NDA holders to list improper use code descriptions to garner a 
thirty-month stay as a result of the generic being required to file paragraph 
IV certifications so that it can employ the counterclaim provision.226 
Consequently, some have gone so far as to say that the FDA should police 
the Orange Book, while others have seemingly sided with the FDA and 
have expressed consternation about subjecting the FDA to burdens that it is 
not equipped to manage.227 During oral arguments in Caraco, Justice 
Kennedy questioned the FDA’s reliance on the Orange Book when the 
FDA “doesn’t do anything to ensure the accuracy of the code.”228 The 
answer to this profoundyet simplequestion is mired in complex issues 
and implications, which this Note has touched upon. Some commentators 
have offered meaningful solutions that may yield effects that are in 
congruence with the underlying principle for the Hatch-Waxman 
Actfacilitating generic entry into the market. 
B.  Additional Administrative Measures 
The FDA has invariably contended that it has only a “ministerial” role 
with respect to Orange Book listings based on practical interests229 and a 
lack of expressed statutory mandate.230 However, mounting judicial 
concerns, as evidenced in Caraco, may cause the FDA to consider taking 
some internal measures to alleviate the issue.   
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occasion and raise its substantive level of review, police patent codes for accuracy, and proactively 
refuse to list overbroad method-of-use patents . . . .”).  
225 Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 3. 
226 Brian J. Malkin & Andrew S. Wasson, Should FDA Undertake More Than a “Ministerial” 
Role with Respect to Patent Information?, 1 FOOD & DRUG POL’Y F., Feb. 23, 2011, at 1. 
227 See James N. Czaban & Brian H. Pandya, Caraco v. Novo Nordisk – A Divided Supreme 
Court, WILEY REIN (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&id=7648 
(stating that Chief Justice Roberts had “expressed concerns” about “greater burdens on the FDA” 
because the FDA does not have patent lawyers on staff). 
228 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 
1670 (2012) (No. 10-844) (quoting Justice Kennedy).   
229 68 Fed. Reg. 36,683 (June 18, 2003) (“In addition to the absence of any statutory basis for a 
substantive agency review of patents, we have long observed that we lack expertise in patent matters. . . 
.  [O]ur patent listing role remains ministerial.”).  
230 Id. at 36,682 (“In the absence of explicit statutory language, we believe an approach that 
requires the NDA applicant or holder or patent owner to identify the approved methods of use protected 
by the patent is most consistent with the general balance adopted in Hatch-Waxman.”). 
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1.  Staff Patent Lawyers and Agents 
One solution is for the FDA to develop an “internal competency” to 
determine the accuracy of patent listings in the Orange Book.231 Many 
jurists suggest that the FDA should employ registered U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office attorneys (or patent analysts), especially those who have 
pharmaceutical backgrounds,232 to determine the accuracy of such listings. 
Judge S. Jay Plager, in his concurring opinion in Apotex v. Thompson, 
asserted that  
[i]t does not seem to me to be an unreasonable expectation 
that the FDA have on its staff a handful of competent patent 
analysts, along with its multitude of scientific specialists, 
who, at a minimum, could make an initial judgment about the 
propriety of a listing, consistent with the statutory 
requirement that the NDA holder file required patent 
information. . . . This would provide a neutral arbiter between 
the NDA holder and the ANDA applicant regarding an 
important matter of process, and would provide some balance 
between these competing interests, a balance that the Hatch-
Waxman Act was intended to establish in the first place.233 
Commentators have indicated that the FDA already practices a similar 
exercise in comparing use code descriptions to a proposed generic label 
when determining whether a generic company may carve out a brand 
manufacturer’s label.234 In addition, the FDA is capable of recognizing 
patent claim types (active ingredient, formulations, method of use, 
products by process, polymorphs) and can distinguish between some 
listable claims and unlistable claims such as intermediate compound and 
processing claims.235 This suggests that the FDA already has some patent 
knowledge and expertise.236 Furthermore, employing patent attorneys 
within the FDA to analyze the finer points for determining listing validity 
may be within reason.237 
In Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Leavitt,238 a case concerning the FDA’s 
Orange Book policy, Judge Stephen Williams contended that even though 
                                                                                                                          
231 Malkin & Wasson, supra note 226, at 1. 
232 Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Plager, J., concurring); 
Malkin & Wasson, supra note 226, at 1–2., 5. 
233 Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1353 (Plager, J., concurring). 
234 Malkin & Wasson, supra note 226, at 6. 
235 Id. 
236 Id.  
237 See id. (“[T]he analysis of determining whether a method-of-use patent claims a use for which 
the generic application is submitted requires a more refined skill-set than a patent listing determination 
. . .  [and] would not be beyond the skills of the competent patent attorneys hired by FDA.”). 
238 548 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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the FDA’s ministerial role is an administrative policy choice that is 
“consistent with the statute,” the statute does not require a ministerial 
role.239 He further concluded that “to read the majority opinion as implying 
that the statute locks the FDA into a ministerial role would be 
inappropriate” and that “[s]uch a reading would prevent the FDA from 
taking a more active role in the listing process.”240 Judge Williams’ view is 
consistent with the notion of an internal patent listing review process for 
allowable Orange Book listings. The Hatch-Waxman Act does not 
expressly or even impliedly bar the FDA from patent review for listing 
purposes. As noted, courts have held that the FDA’s longstanding policy of 
maintaining a “ministerial” role is reasonable under the FD&C Act; 
however, there is no statutory prohibition preventing the FDA from 
expanding its responsibilities.241   
2.  Elevated Oversight for Orange Book Use Code Amendments   
It is perhaps onerous for the FDA to completely assume responsibility 
for actively scrutinizing all use code submissions by innovator companies. 
However, amendments to use codes should rise to the level of elevated 
oversight.242 Due to the volume of patents submitted and number of 
declarations for a patent, it may arguably be burdensome for the FDA to 
police all Orange Book use codes. On average per year, 379 patents are 
submitted for Orange Book listing with approximately fourteen percent of 
individual patents being named in more than one NDA submission.243 This 
results in approximately 432 patents declared on Form FDA 3542,244 which 
is used for filing an NDA or supplement. For the FDA to police all 
submitted use codes may be considered a daunting and burdensome task at 
this time. However, amendments make up a fraction of this volume, which 
may result in a reasonably manageable workload.245 It has been suggested 
                                                                                                                          
239 Id. at 108 (Williams, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion in Teva, 548 F.3d at 106). 
240 Id. at 110. 
241 Malkin & Wasson, supra note 226, at 5 (basing this view on Judge Williams concurring 
remarks in Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 48 F.3d at 110). 
242 See Julie Dohm, Comment, Expanding the Scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Patent Carve-
Out Exception to the Identical Drug Labeling Requirement: Closing the Patent Litigation Loophole, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 151, 191–92 (2007) (indicating that generic companies have proposed that brand 
manufacturers “disclose relevant patents when amending labels” and further suggesting that “[t]he 
FDA can then make a judgment call as to whether the label updates are genuinely for consumer health 
or competitive gain”).   
243 The annual average number of patents was based on “[t]he numbers of patents submitted to the 
FDA for listing in the Orange Book in 2010, 2011, and 2012 were 351, 329, and 458, respectively.” 78 
Fed. Reg. 36,194 (June 17, 2013). 
244 Id.  
245 But see Dohm, supra note 242, at 192 (“[T]he FDA would have to engage in the review of 
patents listed or unlisted in the Orange Book. . . . [Its] workload would increase in amount and 
difficulty if the FDA had to inquire into the purpose of the amendments and the intent of the NDA 
holders.”). 
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that the brand company’s intention should be considered when amending a 
use code“for consumer health or competitive gain”246which would add 
unnecessary burdens on the agency. This Note, however, does not advocate 
or consider any level of evaluation of the brand company’s motivation for 
its use code amendment to the FDA.    
In reviewing amendments, the FDA may be able to quickly assess 
whether a use code amendment is broadened from its previous version. 
This quick assessment may serve as a red flag and indicate whether an 
amendment deserves additional scrutiny. For instance in Caraco, if Novo 
Nordisk’s use code amendment was subjected to elevated FDA 
scrutinyespecially since the use code was clearly broadenedCaraco 
might not have been blocked from its initial section viii statement.   
The amendment of existing use codes by a brand manufacturer may be 
a result of the “remarkably opaque” Orange Book guidelines247 set forth by 
the FDA or may be due to a desire to prolong exclusivity in the market by 
foreclosing generic entry. For either reason, amendments to use codes 
should be subject to enhanced FDA scrutiny and evaluation.   
3.  Implementation of an Orange Book Listing Challenge Mechanism   
Instead of proactive oversight by the FDA, the FDA could consider 
implementing a mechanism at the administrative level for generic 
companies to “challenge” a use code and correct overly broad use codes.248 
Although it has been suggested that this mechanism should be used in 
circumstances where a brand manufacturer omits a patent for listing in the 
Orange Book,249 this suggestion may be extrapolated to instances where a 
generic company suspects an overly broad use code has been listed.  
Standards by which an ANDA filer may bring a challenge should be 
implemented to weed out unwarranted challenges. For a challenge to be 
heard, the ANDA filer must be able to establish a reasonable likelihood of 
success or a more likely than not case for the challenge. The challenger 
must be able to specifically point to patent claims to demonstrate that a use 
code supplied by the brand manufacturer is overly broad. 
                                                                                                                          
246 Id. at 191–92 (“The FDA can then make a judgment call as to whether the label updates are 
genuinely for consumer health or for competitive gain. . . . [T]he agency’s workload would increase in 
amount and difficulty if the FDA had to inquire into the purpose of the amendments and the intent of 
the NDA holders.”). 
247 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1689 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
248 See Dohm, supra note 242, at 194 (“[T]he FDA should set up a mechanism whereby a generic 
can challenge the pioneer’s failure to submit to the FDA a patent for inclusion in the Orange Book.”).   
249 Id. The practice for brand companies to exclude patents from Orange Book listing is also an 
issue for section viii statements. See id. at 193–94 (indicating that patent exclusion from the Orange 
Book is a tactic brand companies use to preclude “proposed carve-outs”). Patent exclusion is not within 
the scope of this Note. 
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Because of the FDA’s unwavering view on its ministerial role, 
congressional action may be needed to effect administrative action.250 Even 
before Caraco v. Novo Nordisk, judges and commentators have suggested 
that Congress should implement statutory provisions that would expressly 
grant the FDA additional authority to actively review Orange Book listings 
or to provide a mechanism for ANDA filers to challenge Orange Book use 
codes.251 In his concurring opinion in Apotex v. Thompson, Judge Plager 
opined that the current FDA practice of correcting an Orange Book listing 
at the administrative levelwhere the FDA “will not modify the listing 
unless the NDA holder agrees” to a modificationis lacking.252 He 
contends that the FDA “could make an initial judgment about the propriety 
of a listing, consistent with the statutory requirement that the NDA holder 
file required patent information”253 and could serve as a “neutral arbiter 
between the NDA holder and the ANDA applicant . . . and would provide 
some balance between these competing interests, a balance that the Hatch-
Waxman Act was intended to establish in the first place.”254 This notion is 
still viable since the counterclaim provision may only be employed upon 
an infringement suit.255    
4.  Generic Drug User Fee Act:  Funds to Support Substantive Orange 
Book Review 
Historically, the FDA has maintained that it does not have the 
resources to provide services beyond a ministerial role. Instituting generic 
filing fees may provide a means for the FDA to fund additional patent 
attorneys. Until October 2013, the FDA did not charge fees for processing 
ANDAs. Many commentators in the field have long asserted that 
instituting an ANDA filing fee would yield the necessary revenue for the 
FDA to support patent law expertise and other resources to properly review 
                                                                                                                          
250  See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“A fix is in order, but it must 
come from Congress or FDA.”). 
251  See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Plager, J., concurring) 
(“If neither the Administration nor the courts see fit to make clear FDA’s obligation to administer the 
Act in a responsible way, Congress should consider doing so.”); Derzko, supra note 25, at 242 
(asserting that Judge Plager “would agree that some kind of administrative mechanism beyond just 
allowing for a patent infringement counterclaim is in order”); see also Christopher R. Walker, Deadly 
Delay / Postponed Pills, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 271–72 (2010) (“[R]eforms may 
take the shape of a new statutory provision to challenge Orange Book listings . . . . The remedy to 
prevent such occurrences in the future is clear statutory language that grants the FDA additional 
power.”). 
252 Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1353 (Plager, J., concurring). 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Judge Plager also indicates that he was “not impressed with the argument that the problem is 
cured because ultimately the validity of any listed patent will be determined by a court” and that “[t]he 
ultimate judicial vindication, . . .  comes much later, and at considerable additional cost.” Id. 
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Orange Booking listings.256 In July 2012, the FDA implemented the 
Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA),257 building on the success 
of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA).258 PDUFA currently 
funds approximately half of new drug review efforts. This increased 
funding has effectively terminated the “slow and unpredictable review and 
approval” process for NDAs while maintaining the high standards 
required.259 PDUFA funds provide the FDA with the ability to hire 
additional staff to expedite the NDA review process. For instance, the FDA 
nearly doubled the number of full-time drug review staff members from 
1,277 in 1992 to 2,503 in 2004.260 Substantively, the FDA was able to 
generally improve drug development by providing the brand drug 
companies guidance for reducing unnecessary drug trials and improving 
application submissions. Furthermore, with the added resources, the FDA 
strengthened its review process and standards, making it “more rigorous, 
consistent, and predictable.”261 Collectively, these improvements resulted 
in decreased development costs and lessened review periods.262 In effect, 
these desirable developments allowed the FDA to provide the public with 
more efficient access to new drugs.   
Similar to PDUFA, GDUFA’s underlying policy rationale is “to speed 
access to safe and effective drugs to the public and reduce costs to 
industry.”263 GDUFA requires that ANDA applicants now pay a fee for the 
review of their application and for the inspection of generic drug facilities. 
Hence, GDUFA funds will enable the FDA to address the backlog of 
                                                                                                                          
256 Ruocco, supra note 224, at 383–84. 
257 21 U.S.C. § 379j-42(a)(4) (2012); FDA, GENERIC DRUG USER FEE AMENDMENTS OF 2012 
(2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrugUserFees/default.htm 
(indicating that GDUFA includes ANDA, Drug Master Fees File fees (DMF), Prior Approval 
Supplement (PAS), Backlog, and Facility fees) (last updated Aug. 6, 2014). 
258  21 U.S.C. §§ 379j(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(A) (2012); FDA, PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT, 
http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/prescriptiondruguserfee/default.htm. The FDA, pursuant to its 
administrative policy to promote supplementary funds without raising new taxes, proposed to institute 
user fees for NDAs, for instance $126,200 for a full NDA. HUTT ET AL., supra note 32, at 678–81. This 
was met with resistance from pharmaceutical companies and Congress. Id. at 678–79. The 
pharmaceutical industry feared that these fees were planned to replacenot add toappropriated 
funds. Id. By 1992, the NDA approval time “reached a high of three years.” Id. at 679. As a result, the 
pharmaceutical industry’s opposition toward user fees waned, and the industry agreed to support fees. 
Id. The pharmaceutical industry and the FDA reached an agreement that user fees would supplement, 
not replace “existing FDA baseline appropriations.” Id. PDUFA was enacted in 1992 with the 
underlying reason to provide the FDA with additional funds to support the NDA process in order 
improve FDAs efficiency while maintaining high standards. Id. at 679–81.  
259 HUTT ET AL., supra note 32, at 680.  
260 Id.   
261 Id.  
262 Id. (indicating that the NDA applications median approval time reduced from 13.2 months 
before the PDUFA in 1993 to 6.4 months in 2003).  
263 GDUFA Legislation and Background, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees 
/GenericDrugUserFees/ucm337385.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2014). 
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pending applications, reduce the median time for ANDA review, and 
promote inspections.264   
With this newly enacted fee collection regime, the FDA may also be 
able to fund efforts toward actively reviewing the Orange Book beyond its 
current ministerial role by hiring patent attorneys to delineate patent claims 
and use codes. In 2013, GDUFA was anticipated to garner $299 million265 
in funding for the FDA, in part, by charging $51,520 for each original 
ANDA application.266 Since the approval process for an ANDA application 
is significantly less complex and time consuming, the GDUFA ANDA fee 
pales in comparison to a PDUFA NDA fee of $1,958,800 in 2013.267 The 
current $51,520 rate for an ANDA review is rather nominal; hence, the 
FDA may be able to reasonably increase the rate to cover the costs 
necessary to substantively review Orange Book listings.268   
5.  Change in Listing Requirements:  Use Codes Should Be Identical to 
the Patent Claim 
As suggested by some practitioners, an alternative that the FDA may 
resort to without significantly increasing the burden upon itself is to 
require use codes to be identical in language to the patent’s claims.269 Not 
allowing the brand company to “free-hand” its use code language would 
eliminate any listing manipulation.270 Furthermore, it would extinguish any 
guesswork and additional verification needed by the FDA in determining 
whether a use code is duly listed. Proponents of this practice assert that this 
alternative may significantly prevent “variability” or “abuse” without 
incurring costs or overburdening the FDA.271 This proposed practice may 
not require the FDA to provide additional patent law staff to construe the 
use code against the patent claim. 
                                                                                                                          
264 Alexander Gaffney, FDA Tries to Clear ANDA Backlog Before User Fee Assessment, 
REGULATORY FOCUS (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-
view/article/2142/fda-tries-to-clear-anda-backlog-before-user-fee-assessment.aspx (assuming that there 
are approximately 2,500 ANDAs backlogged); Kurt R. Karst, Our GDUFA Cup Runneth Over! FDA 
Sets Several 2013 User Fee Rates, FDA L. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_ 
law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/10/our-gdufa-cup-runneth-over-fda-sets-several-fy-2013-user-fee-
rates.html (indicating that are well over 2,000 ANDAs backlogged as of 2012). 
265 Karst, supra note 264. 
266 2013 Frequently Asked Questions: Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA) and Prior 
Approval Supplement (PAS) Fees, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/generic 
druguserfees/ucm363561.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2013). 
267 77 Fed. Reg. 45,639, 45,642, 45,643 (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/ FR-2012-08-01/pdf/2012-18711.pdf. 
268 The FDA has listed its anticipated ANDA fee of $58,730 for 2015. Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) and Prior Approval Supplement (PAS) Fees, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrugUserFees/ucm319568.htm (last updated July 31, 2014). 
269 SHASHANK UPADHYE, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT AND FDA LAW 549 (2011).  
270 Id. at 549; Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 5. 
271 Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 5, 7. 
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Although, this suggestion attempts to limit the ability for brand 
manufacturers to “free-hand” use codes to limit manipulation, a 
requirement for use codes to be identical in language to patent claims may 
pose some issues. Sometimes method of use patent claims are broader in 
scope than that of the FDA-approved use of the drug.272 Patent claims are 
oftentimes drafted years in advance of the FDA-approved indication and 
method of use. The patentee attempts to anticipate the FDA-approved 
method of use of the drug when filing the patent application. Thus, this 
practice may result in claims that are broader than the eventual FDA-
approved method of use.273 Hence, requiring the brand manufacturer to use 
only the claim language as a use code may present the same issue at 
handan overly broad use code.   
This suggested listing requirement would also impose an additional 
burden on the FDA to evaluate and discern whether the FDA-approved use 
falls within the patent claims. The suggested listing practice of requiring 
only the claim language to be used may not place responsibility on the 
NDA filer to ensure that the FDA-approved use is supported by the claims. 
Since the FDA-approved use may have language that is different than the 
patent claims, it would necessitate further FDA evaluation that involves 
expertise that the FDA asserts it does not have. As a result, this listing 
requirement suggestion may not succeed in simplifying the current listing 
regime. 
6.   Change in Listing Requirements: Use Codes Should Be Identical to 
the FDA-Approved Use  
Arguably a more effective change in listing requirements is to require 
use codes to be identical to the FDA-approved method of use, provided 
that this approved method of use is within the scope of the patent claims. A 
use code that is identical to the FDA-approved method not only forecloses 
the ability for the NDA applicant to draft “creative” use codes, but it would 
only allow the more precise FDA-approved method of use language to be 
used rather than the claim language, which tends to be broad in scope. This 
proposed listing requirement places the duty on the NDA filer to ensure 
                                                                                                                          
272 See Li Feng & Bryan C. Diner, The U.S. Supreme Court “Cracks the Code,” Allowing Generic 
Drug Manufacturers Increased Access to the Market Through Skinny Labeling, FINNEGAN (June 2012), 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=5144c2c5-a42f-4ecc-b326-
7545d95d417f (suggesting that brand manufacturers should “secure broad patents” and that “method of 
use patent claims should be drafted broadly”).    
273  See id. (suggesting that “it is a good practice to . . . envision what kind of uses, down to the 
very details such as dosages, administration routes and regimens, indications, and combination 
therapies, will be sought for approval at the FDA, and draft the patent claims accordingly[,]” because 
“label language is not easily predicted”). 
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that the FDA-approved use is within the scope of the claims274 and 
simplifies the FDA’s task of discerning whether a section viii carve-out is 
possible.  
This proposed listing requirement may be straightforward in instances 
where the FDA-approved method of use is the same or narrower in scope 
than the patent claims. Although it may appear to be more complex in 
instances where the FDA-approved use is broader than the patent claim, 
the proposed listing requirement may still be viable. Consider an example 
where “[t]he FDA [has] approve[d] Drug X to treat Condition Y in surgical 
patients,” where surgical patients include both pre-surgical and post-
surgical patients.275 The NDA filer has an Orange Book listed patent claim 
for the method of using Drug X to treat Condition Y in pre-surgical 
patients.276 Under the current listing practices, the NDA filer may draft a 
use code for Drug X to state “treatment of Condition Y in surgical 
patients”an “exact[] match[]” to the FDA-approved indication.277 This 
use code would preclude an ANDA filer from a section viii statement. For 
generic market entry, the only path for the ANDA filer would be to assert 
the counterclaim provision to have the broad use code narrowed to the 
treatment of Condition Y in pre-surgical patients.278 But before the 
counterclaim can even be asserted, the ANDA filer must file a paragraph 
IV certification and wait for the NDA filer to file suit.279 
However, this example would play out very differently in the proposed 
listing requirement regime. Under the proposed listing requirement, the 
NDA filer would be precluded from using the use code “treatment of 
Condition Y in surgical patients”280 even though it is an exact match to the 
FDA-approved use. Because the scope of the patent claim is for pre-
                                                                                                                          
274 Form FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a expressly state that submissions are made “under 
penalty of perjury that the foregoing [information] is true and correct.” Patent Information Submitted 
Upon and After Approval of an NDA or Supplement, FDA, 3 (Nov. 2014), http://www.fda.gov 
/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/forms/ucm048345.pdf [hereinafter Form FDA 3542]; Patent 
Information Submitted with the Filing of an NDA, Amendment, or Supplement, FDA (Nov. 2014), at 
3, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/ UCM048352 
.pdf [hereinafter Form FDA 3542a]. 
275 This is a hypothetical example taken from Terry G. Mahn, Drug Labeling Games – Skinny 
Labels Getting an FDA Assist, PHARMACEUTICAL COMPLIANCE MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www. 
fr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Mahn.PharmaComplianceMonitor.DrugLabelingGames%E2%80%93
SkinnyLabelsGettinganFDAAssist.March2014.pdf. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 See id. (indicating that the ANDA filer “could argue that the use code is too broad and should 
be narrowed to cover only pre-surgical patients” in a paragraph IV litigation). 
279 See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1688 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (illustrating that “the generic manufacturer . . . submit[s] an ANDA with a paragraph IV 
certification [and] . . . wait[s] for the brand manufacturer to institute suit” before a counterclaim is 
filed). 
280 Id. 
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surgical patients, the NDA filer would only be allowed to draft a use code 
for Drug X for “treatment of Condition Y in pre-surgical patients.” As a 
result, a section viii statement for treatment of Condition Y in post-surgical 
patients is not foreclosed to ANDA filers.   
The FDA may be far from adopting this listing requirement; however, 
some recent activity suggests a slight shift toward this standard. In 
November 2013, the FDA revised the Information and Instructions for 
Patent Information Submitted Upon and After Approval of an NDA or 
Supplement (Form FDA 3542) and Patent Information Submitted with the 
Filing of an NDA, Amendment, or Supplement (Form FDA 3542a).281  
Although the fields that require information on both forms were not 
changed, the instructions accompanying the method of use information 
were altered. The revised instructions for section 4.2a in both Form FDA 
3542 and Form FDA 3542a state that the NDA filer should “[i]dentify the 
precise words of the approval labeling that describe with specificity the 
patented method of use.”282 Prior to this revision, the section 4.2a for Form 
FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a stated that the NDA filer should 
“[s]pecify the part of the proposed drug labeling that is claimed by the 
patent.”283 Some commentators suggest that this revision may be an effort 
by the FDA “to bring more order to use code issues examined in [Caraco 
v. Novo Nordisk].”284 Although this instructional revision does not by any 
means suggest that the FDA requires the use code to be identical to the 
approved method of use or indication, it may compel the NDA filer to 
examine the approved method of use and patent claims with more 
particularity than before.285   
This increase in the number of use codes is not necessarily 
problematic. In recent years, the average number of use codes in the 
Orange Book has grown by ninety-eight use codes per year.286 To date, 
there are approximately 1,411 use codes published in the Orange Book.287 
                                                                                                                          
281 Form FDA 3542, supra note 274, at 4; Form FDA 3542a, supra note 274, at 4.   
282 Form FDA 3542, supra note 274, at 4; Form FDA 3542a, supra note 274, at 4. 
283 FDA Revises Forms for Submission of Patent Information to the Orange Book: Federal Circuit 
Decision in Novartis AG v. Lee Alters Patent Term Adjustment, HOGAN LOVELLS PHARMACEUTICAL 
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY ALERT (Feb. 26, 2014), http://ehoganlovells.com/rv/ff00159909f14 
81b42df376f3f4c9382a7182abe. 
284 Id. 
285 Form FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a explicitly state that the NDA Applicant “verif[ies] 
under penalty of perjury that the [application information] is true and correct.” Form FDA 3542, supra 
note 274, at 3; Form FDA 3542a, supra note 274, at 3. 
286 The average growth in number of use codes was based on the growth in number of use codes 
for years 2011, 2012, and 2013, determined to be 78, 104, and 117, respectively. See Kurt R. Karst, 
Updated Analysis Shows Patent Use Codes Have Nearly Tripled Since 2003, FDA L. BLOG (July 8, 
2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/07/updated-analysis-shows-pate 
nt-use-codes-have-nearly-tripled-since-august-2003.html. 
287 Id. 
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This growing number of use codes may increase the likelihood of ANDA 
filers employing the counterclaim provision.288 This proposition, of course, 
is highly dependent on the manner in which the use codes were 
draftedduly tailored to the approved method of use or broadly 
described.289 The increase in use codes as a result of adopting the listing 
regimewhere the use code must be identical to the FDA-approved 
method of use, provided that it is within the scope of the claimswould 
effectively make the use codes specific and precise and would reduce the 
use of the counterclaim provision.   
Given the longstanding view of the FDA’s ministerial role, perhaps the 
FDA may be more likely to institute a change in listing requirements rather 
than a proactive use code evaluation. Although changes in listing 
requirements may still require an increase in the number of hours per Form 
FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a,290 it may be the least burdensome 
measure for the agency to implement relative to actively policing the 
Orange Book use code submissions and amendments or implementing an 
administrative Orange Book correction “challenge,” which would require 
substantially more staff and hours dedicated to use code review. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Since the FDA continues to maintain its longstanding view of having 
only a “ministerial” role in managing the accuracy of use codes in the 
Orange Booka pivotal publication for the prescription drug 
industryand no substantive delisting or correction mechanism is 
available, generic companies that wish to simply file a section viii 
statement are faced with only one path for use code correctionsthe 
counterclaim provision. To employ the counterclaim provision, generics 
must face paragraph IV litigation, which is procedurally cumbersome and 
costly. The counterclaim provision is not an effective patch on a procedural 
hole; it is not a fix.   
To clarify issues with regard to listing practices, the FDA has 
implemented its “final rule” and instituted declaration forms. 
Unfortunately, this “final rule” and current guidelines are “remarkably 
opaque.”291 The lack of oversight of a crucial publicationthe Orange 
Bookis a source of frustration in facilitating the entry of generic drugs 
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289 Id. 
290 See 78 Fed. Reg. 57,165 (Sept. 17, 2013) (reporting on the number of total hours spent and the 
“[a]verage burden per response” for Form FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a). 
291 See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1689 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“Precisely because the regulatory scheme depends on the accuracy and precision of use 
codes, I find FDA’s guidance as to what is required of brand manufacturers in use codes remarkably 
opaque.”). 
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into the healthcare market. Many commentators agree that policing the 
Orange Book is needed while others feel that this creates a burden on the 
FDA. However, there is agreement that the current regime is insufficient. 
Although it may be burdensome at this time for the FDA to bear total 
responsibility for policing the Orange Book, an elevated oversight, a 
change in listing requirements, or at least a modification to the guidelines 
provided by the FDA is much needed.  
 
 
 
 

